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ABSTRACT
Typically, computer viruses and other malware are detected by searching for a string of 
bits which is found in the virus or malware. Such a string can be viewed as a 
“fingerprint” of the virus. These “fingerprints” are not generally unique; however they 
can be used to make rapid malware scanning feasible. This fingerprint is often called a 
signature and the technique of detecting viruses using signatures is known as signature-
based detection [8].
Today, virus writers often camouflage their viruses by using code obfuscation techniques 
in an effort to defeat signature-based detection schemes. So-called metamorphic viruses 
are viruses in which each instance has the same functionality but differs in its internal 
structure. Metamorphic viruses differ from polymorphic viruses in the method they use to 
hide their signature. While polymorphic viruses primarily rely on encryption for signature 
obfuscation, metamorphic viruses hide their signature via “mutating” their own code [3].
The paper [1] provides a rigorous proof that metamorphic viruses can bypass any 
signature-based detection, provided the code obfuscation has been done carefully based 
on a set of specified rules. Specifically, according to [1], if dead code is added and the 
control flow is changed sufficiently by inserting jump statements, the virus cannot be 
detected.
In this project we first developed a code obfuscation engine conforming to the rules in 
[1]. We then used this engine to create metamorphic variants of a seed virus (created 
using the PS-MPK virus creation kit [15]) and demonstrated the validity of the assertion 
in [1] about metamorphic viruses and signature based detectors. In the second phase of 
this project we validated another theory advanced in [2], namely, that machine learning 
based methodsspecifically ones based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM) can detect 
metamorphic viruses. In other words, we show that a collection of metamorphic viruses 
which are (provably) undetectable via signature detection techniques can nevertheless be 
detected using an HMM approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION
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In today’s age, where a majority of the transactions involving sensitive information 
access happen on computers and over the internet, it is absolutely imperative to treat 
information security as a concern of paramount importance. Computer viruses and other 
malware have been in existence from the very early days of the personal computer and 
continue to pose a threat to home and enterprise users alike. As anti-virus technologies 
evolved to combat these viruses, the virus writers too changed their tactics and mode of 
operation to create more complex and harder to detect viruses and the game of cat and 
mouse continued.
Both viruses and virus detectors have gone through several generations of change since 
the first appearance of viruses and this thesis is particularly concerned with a recent stage 
in virus evolutionmetamorphic viruses. These are viruses which employ code 
obfuscation techniques to hide and mutate their appearance in host programs as a means 
to avoid detection. The most popular virus detection technique employed today is 
signature based static detection, which involves looking for a fingerprint-like sequence of 
bits (extracted from a known sample of the virus) in the suspect file. Metamorphic 
viruses are quite potent against this technique since they can create variants of themselves 
by code-morphing and the morphed variants do not necessarily have a common signature. 
In fact, the paper [1] provides a rigorous proof that metamorphic viruses can bypass any 
signature-based detection, provided the code obfuscation has been done based on a set of 
specified rules. These rules include dead code insertion and jump statements to obfuscate 
the control flow.
For this thesis a code obfuscating engine conforming to the rules specified in [1] has been 
created and using it we  demonstrate that viruses obfuscated with this engine are not 
detectable by commercial virus scanners employing signature based detection. A second 
experiment was then carried out to test the hypothesis in [2] that metamorphic viruses can 
be detected by machine learning based methods (in this case employing Hidden Markov 
Models or HMMs). The detection engine in [2] was tested against metamorphic viruses 
generated by our obfuscation engine to determine the effectiveness of this detection 
approach.
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This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides background 
information and some history on how viruses evolved, from the point of view of 
detection avoidance. We also consider various techniques used by virus writers including 
encryption and code obfuscation. Some background information on the current state of 
virus detection is also presented.  Chapter 3 provides details on the HMM model and its 
application to the problem of detecting metamorphic viruses. A complete description of 
the code obfuscation engine created for this project is provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
details the experimental setup used for this project and the various experiments 
performed with the metamorphic code generation engine. Chapter 6 records the 
conclusions from the experiments and provides some suggestions for future research.
2. A HISTORY OF VIRUS EVOLUTION FROM A 
DETECTION AVOIDANCE PERSPECTIVE
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2.1. Stealth viruses
Virus writers have been employing techniques to avoid detection from the earliest days of 
computer viruses. One of the first techniques virus writers employed to evade detection 
was to keep the last modified date of an infected file unchanged to make it seem like it 
was uninfected.  Virus detectors combated this tactic by maintaining cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC) logs on files to detect infection. Other viruses tried to hide in memory and 
maintained copies of infected files, taking over system functions for reading files or disk 
sectors and redirecting virus detectors to the unaffected copies to evade detection. 
“Brain”, the very first PC virus was an example of such a virus which redirected attempts 
to read infected boot sectors to the area of the disk where the original boot sector was 
stored [11]. The catch here was that the virus had to be memory resident to do this and 
virus detectors began to analyze memory as well for evidence of viruses as a 
countermeasure. Brain also was the origin of the rule of thumb: starting from a clean 
trusted disk before checking the status of a system.
2.2. Encrypted and Polymorphic viruses
The next stage in virus evolution produced viruses which used encryption as a technique 
to obfuscate their presence. One of the earliest examples of a virus using encryption as an 
anti-detection technique was Cascade, a DOS virus [11]. Encrypted viruses typically 
carry along a decryption engine and thus they have to maintain a small portion of the 
virus body unencrypted. Virus detectors began to tackle these viruses by looking for the 
signature bits in this unencrypted portion. Oligomorphic viruses then appeared, where the 
viruses employed multiple decryption algorithms (one simple way was to carry along 
multiple decryption engines and pick one at random) making pattern based detection 
more difficult [12]. Then came polymorphic viruses which were basically encrypted 
viruses capable of mutating their decryption engines in each generation. Polymorphic 
viruses created variants of themselves which used a different encryption mechanism in 
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each generation resulting in different decryption engines and thus effectively countering 
scanners looking for the signature of the decryptor [12]. 
Polymorphic viruses necessitated further evolution in anti-virus technology and the 
answer came in the form of static emulation. In this detection technique, the virus 
decryption process is executed in a controlled environment and the location of the 
decrypted virus is captured. After decryption, the virus detector can locate a signature 
string in the decrypted virus and use that to detect subsequent infections of the same virus 
just as if the virus were unencrypted. Figure 1 below [4] pictorially illustrates how 
polymorphic viruses evolve with each generation.
Figure 1: How polymorphic viruses evolve with each generation [4]
2.3. Metamorphic viruses
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Polymorphic viruses have one major Achilles heelthe virus body is identical in each 
generation. Therefore,  if a polymorphic virus is somehow decrypted it can subsequently 
be detected by pattern-based detection. Metamorphic viruses were the next stage in virus 
evolution. These viruses do not rely on encryption as an obfuscation technique but 
instead mutate their own code structure through operations such as dead code insertion 
and control flow obfuscation, which yields generational variants that are very different. 
This is illustrated pictorially in Figure 2 [4] 
Figure 2: Evolution of generations of a metamorphic virus [4]
2.3.1. Obfuscation techniques used in metamorphic viruses
Metamorphic viruses can obfuscate their data flow by various techniques including 
register exchange (using different registers in each generation), instruction swap 
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(replacing instructions with other equivalent ones), permutation (subroutine reordering), 
transposition (reordering instructions which are not order dependant) and dead code 
insertion (adding nop and other “do nothing” statements). They can also obfuscate their 
control flow can by extensive use of jump instructions. Some metamorphic viruses carry 
their own metamorphic engines. For example, Zperm carries along its own metamorphic 
engine, which is known as the Real Permuting Engine or RPME [12]. Other metamorphic 
generators operate “offline”, in the sense that the metamorphic engine is independent of 
the virus itself.  Figure 3 [4] illustrates how jump instructions and instruction reordering 
are used in the Zperm virus to obfuscate the virus body.
Figure 3: Instruction reordering and jump statement insertion in Zperm [4]
Regardless of the actual technique used to obfuscate the virus body, metamorphic viruses 
have one shared characteristic which gives them their potency and makes them difficult 
to detectthey do not provide any moment in their evolution when a constant code body 
is completely observable. Note that this is in contrast to polymorphic viruses.
2.3.2.Metamorphic virus generation toolkits  
Virus writing used to be the purview of a few dedicated “enthusiasts”. However, the past 
several years have seen the emergence of several virus generation toolkits which has 
made creating a potent virus very easy. These toolkits range from rudimentary ones to 
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very elaborate tools with GUIs which can generate polymorphic and metamorphic 
viruses. Some of the more sophisticated toolkits come complete with anti-debugging and 
emulation resistant techniques built in. VX Heavens [14], which is a resource for virus 
creators and researchers, lists well over a hundred virus generation toolkits. Some of the 
more advanced toolkits include the Next Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK), 
Phalcon/Skism Mass Produced Code Generator (PS-MPC), Mass Code Generator 
(MPCGEN), etc. 
For the purposes of this project the PS-MPC toolkit [17] has been used to generate 
sample viruses. According to Szor [3], PS-MPC generates viruses that are not only 
polymorphic but have different decryption routines and structures in variants.
2.4. Other malware self-defense techniques (Rootkits, Packers etc)
In addition to the techniques discussed earlier in this section there are several other 
techniques employed by virus writers to avoid being detected by anti-virus programs. 
Some of the more common ones include Rootkits, Packers and anti-debugging 
techniques. 
Rootkits are programs that reside in a computer system without authorization and take 
control of the operating system [6]. They are designed to conceal malicious programs in 
the system to make it very difficult to detect the malicious programs using antivirus or 
other security software. Execution Path Modification (modifying a chain of system calls 
and using API level hooks to hijack system functions) and Direct Kernel Object 
Modification (modifying information or commands directly in the kernel source) are 
some common techniques used by Rootkit technologies. The deeper these Rootkits are 
located in the system the more difficult it is to find them.  Newer trends in Rootkits 
include Firmware rootkits which attack the firmware supplied with devices and 
Virtualized rootkits which modify the boot sequence, load themselves instead of the 
original OS and then load the original OS as an enslaved virtual machine [18]. 
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Packers are programs that compress viruses making them difficult to be detected. When 
virus writers try to create new viruses by building on or modifying existing viruses the 
heart of the virus remains the same with some extra lines of code. Viruses created in this 
manner are hence easily detected by many virus scanners using pattern based detection. 
By packing the files virus creators bypass the problem as changing even one byte in the 
unpacked executable results in a very differently byte sequenced packed file. Figure 4 [6] 
below illustrates the difference between a packed and unpacked virus executable.
Figure 4: Difference between a packed and unpacked virus [6]
Figure 5 [6] provides a graphical breakdown of the various self defense techniques used 
by malware writers in the year 2007. We can see that packing was the most popular 
technique (possibly due to the large return on investment virus writers derive by 
employing this technique and its simplicity). Encryption and code obfuscation tied for 
second place with Rootkits. One possible reason Metamorphism was less commonly seen 
could be because the technique is harder to implement in practice than some of the others. 
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This might however change in the future with the proliferation of metamorphic virus 
generation toolkits.
Figure 5: Approximate breakdown of malware self defense techniques in 2007 [6]
2.5. Current state of virus detection techniques
Anti-virus technologies today use a variety of techniques to detect viruses. The objectives 
of these technologies are to detect viruses with a high degree of accuracy, produce very 
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few false positives, and accomplish the detection process in a reasonable amount of time. 
Some of the different detection techniques employed today includes:
• Pattern based detection
• Emulation based detection
• Static analysis based detection
• Heuristics and statistical methods
Below, we briefly discuss each of these techniques.
2.5.1.String scanning or pattern based detection  
The most popular technique in anti-virus scanners today is pattern based detection. It is 
not as effective as some other techniques but it can be performed more quickly. This 
technique involves extracting a unique sequence of bits from a known virus and this 
sample is subsequently used like a fingerprint to match against while scanning for 
existence of the virus. Care has to be taken when choosing the bit sequence to minimize 
the number of  false positives and at the same time match the virus and (ideally) possible 
variants. Sometimes statistical techniques are also used to extract these patterns. Figure 6 
[4] shows an example of a search pattern for the “Stoned“ boot sector virus. In this case, 
the bit sequence selected was chosen by observing a behavioral peculiarity of the virus (it 
reads the boot sector of the diskette four times, resetting the disk between each try).
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Figure 6: Stoned virus showing the search pattern 0400 B801 020E 07BB 0002 33C9 8BD1 419C [4]
Second generation pattern based detectors use more advanced techniques such as “smart 
scanning” (ignoring nop instructions), using wildcards (allowing skipping of bytes and 
byte ranges), generic matching (using a single string to potentially match a family of 
viruses), near exact identification (using two search strings instead of one), using a 
checksum of a constant range found in the virus body and, finally, the most accurate 
methodexact identification (using checksums of all the constant bits found in the 
virus).
2.5.2.Emulation based detection  
Emulation based detection is a powerful anti-virus technique where the virus is executed 
in a controlled environment (a virtual machine, or VM, emulating the instructions of the 
real processor and the interface of the operating system) and the behavior of the virus is 
observed. This technique is particularly useful with polymorphic and encrypted viruses 
where the virus is allowed to decrypt itself and then a snapshot of the decrypted virus can 
be captured for analysis from the virtual machines memory structures.
One drawback of emulation-based detection is that the virus execution in the VM 
environment can sometimes take relatively long, especially when the virus has many 
garbage instructions in a loop. Code optimization techniques are sometimes applied in 
such cases for faster execution.
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2.5.3.Static analysis based detection  
Figure 7: Stages in static analysis of virus binaries [15]
In this detection method, heuristic and formal analysis techniques are used to analyze the 
virus after it has been taken through several stages of information recovery. The stages in 
static analysis are depicted in Figure 7 [15]. The first stage involves disassembling he 
virus binary. The most common technique in this step is the linear sweep approach used 
in interactive debuggers like IDA Pro. Once the assembly level instructions have been 
recovered, the next stage involves determining procedural boundaries and obtaining a 
control flow graph (CFG) representation of the program. After this data flow analysis is 
performed on the CFG to find out instructions which modify the memory locations or 
registers used by other instructions.
Finally in the property verification stage, a directed graph based on the code is compared 
with a formal representation of suspicious activities/properties and a determination is 
made on whether the program is malicious or benign. Model checking against a finite 
state machine representation of the suspicious properties is a common static analysis 
approach.
In addition to the detection methods discussed in detail in this chapter, other methods like 
statistical analysis and machine learning based methods have also been used. One such 
technique (HMMs) will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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3. HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS APPLIED TO 
METAMORPHIC VIRUS DETECTION 
Metamorphic viruses have an interesting property which make behavioral analysis based 
approaches a viable option for detecting these viruses [2]. Specifically – the generational 
variants of the same metamorphic virus family despite their differences do share a high 
degree of similarity especially when compared to normal files because they tend to differ 
a lot from normal files. This can be seen from Figure 8 [2] which shows a comparison of 
the average similarity scores computed using HMM for a family of metamorphic viruses 
and a set of normal files.
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Figure 8: Average similarity score comparison for metamorphic viruses and normal files
Wing Wong and Mark Stamp propose in [2] the application of Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) based statistical analysis to the detection of metamorphic viruses to take 
advantage of this property. Their idea is to use a two step approach - HMM based 
modeling is first used to represent the statistical properties of a family of metamorphic 
viruses (i.e. the model is trained on a metamorphic virus family) and then later the trained 
model is used to determine whether a given program is similar to the virus or different.
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The second phase of this project aims to demonstrate that viruses created by our code 
obfuscation engine can be identified by this HMM based method described in [2].
3.1. The Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) are state machine based statistical models which can be 
used to describe a set of observations generated by a stochastic process. Such processes 
(also called Markov processes) can be modeled as a sequence of states, where the 
progression to the next state depends solely on the present state but not on the past states. 
The underlying stochastic process modeled in a HMM is “hidden” and all we can see is 
the sequence of observations associated with the states. The idea here is to make use of 
the information observed about the process to gain an understanding of the underlying 
Markov process [18]. HMMs are well suited for statistical pattern analysis and have been 
applied to solve various problems of this nature including speech pattern analysis and 
biological sequence analysis.
3.1.1.Training the HMM  
When a HMM is trained on a particular data set  the states in the model represent features 
of the data set under observation and are associated with a probability distribution for the 
set of symbols under observation. The state transitions represent the transition 
probabilities between the observed states and have fixed values.
In [2] where HMM was applied to the problem of recognizing metamorphic viruses, the 
HMM states corresponded to features of the virus code, while the observations about the 
data (in this case metamorphic viruses) were instructions or opcodes making up the virus 
program. The idea here was that the HMM should after training be able to detect 
similarities between (and assign high probabilities to) the viruses from the same 
metamorphic family the model was trained on.
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3.1.2.Assembly code comparison and scoring  
The comparison process used in [2] is graphically depicted in Figure 9 [2]. The process 
was first outlined by Mishra in [16] and is based on finding identical opcode sequences in 
the two programs. The first step is to extract opcodes from the program (comments, 
labels etc are excluded). Each opcode is then assigned a number and the sequence of 
opcodes in the two programs is compared to find common subsequences of size three. 
The match locations in the code in one program X are then plotted against match 
locations in the other program Y. Identical code segments thus appear as line segments 
parallel to the main diagonal (for the case where the programs have identical sizes the 
main diagonal is the 45 degree line).
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Figure 9: Method used to compare assembly programs (virus families and benign programs) [2]
In paper [2] Wing Wong presented the results for the above comparison performed on 
four different families of viruses (created using 4 different metamorphic virus generation 
kits: NGVCK, G2, VCL32, MPCGEN) and a set of normal files. These results are shown 
in Figure 10 below. We can see that viruses from the same family score very similar and 
the scores are noticeably different from those for the normal files. The MPCGEN and 
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VCL32 families share some overlap in their scores indicating that the generators create 
similar viruses and probably perform similar morphing operations. NGVCK clearly 
performs much better than the other virus generator kits in creating viruses which look 
very different from other viruses and normal files. Interestingly enough it is this 
exceptional ability to look different which helps the HMM recognize viruses from this 
family
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Figure 10: HMM similarity scores for different metamorphic virus families [2]
In phase three of our experiments we trained the HMM model described in [2] on 
metamorphic viruses created by our code obfuscation engine and then determined the 
similarity scores for other variants from the same family and also normal files. The 
experiment details and results are presented in chapter 5.
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4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METAMORPHIC CODE 
GENERATOR
For this project we implemented a code morphing engine in Perl confirming to the 
specifications in [1]. This engine was intended to work with any given block of assembly 
code.  
4.1. Background theory
The authors in [1] advance formal proofs for their specific code morphing suggestions. 
Their contention is that the assembly code of the original virus should first be separated 
into small blocks of code based on two basic conditions. The first condition being that no 
block should end with any kind of jump instruction (JMP, JNZ, JGE etc). The second 
condition being that no block should end with a NOP operation. They also require that 
the virus carry its own metamorphic engine (i.e. the virus should know how to strip out 
the garbage code and re-order the blocks without outside assistance). From a virus 
detection point of view it is even harder to detect metamorphic viruses which do not carry 
their own metamorphic engine, hence we ignored this restriction in [1] and made the code 
morphing engine a separate entity.
After the code is separated into blocks the order of the code blocks has to be randomly 
shuffled. After the blocks are shuffled, small blocks of dead code (also known as garbage 
code) have to be inserted between the blocks of original code. Dead code is a block of 
code which is syntactically correct but semantically irrelevant to the program being 
executed. Once the dead code is added, the correct flow of the virus code is controlled by 
the result achieved from a mathematical equation which always computes to the same 
value. The idea is to use an equation which always results in the same result (condition 
always true or always false) but at the same time is a sufficiently complex expression that 
it is difficult analyze from assembly code.
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4.2. Implementation details
For our project we chose a fixed block size of three for simplicity. Care was taken while 
splitting the code into blocks to make sure that none of the blocks ended with a jump 
instruction or a NOP instruction. If either of these types of instructions happened to be 
the last instruction of the block then we included the instruction succeeding the 
jump/NOP into the same block.
After the blocks were created, the starting address of each block was stored in an array 
and a conditional jump instruction pointing to the next block was added at the end of each 
block. This jump instruction was constructed depend on the result of a relatively complex 
mathematical equation. Complexity here implies that by manually reading the equation it 
is not apparent that the result is always the same for a set of given values. Since the 
equation always gives the same result, in all versions of the virus the jump instruction 
will always point to the logically correct sequence of blocks. Once these jump statements 
were inserted the blocks were randomly shuffled and blocks of dead code were inserted 
between blocks.
This project was implemented in three principal modules. The first module was designed 
to count the number of lines in the entire block of code and divide the program into 
smaller blocks of code. After that the second module stored the program in an array and 
appended conditional jump instructions to the end of each code block. The condition used 
to determine the value of integer ‘k’ is as follows:
Figure 11: Equation to determine the value of integer 'k'
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The letter ‘a’ in the above equation refers to any integer value. This equation will always 
result in k=1 for even values of ‘a’ and k=2 for odd values of ‘a’. Here the integer k 
determines the jump condition. The third module performed the process of obfuscation. 
This was  achieved in two steps. In the first step some small blocks of dead code were 
added at the end of the array storing the generated code blocks. The dead code blocks 
used were also the same as the ones mentioned in [1]. They are as follows:
 
Figure 12: Dead code blocks
In the second step the small blocks of codes were randomly shuffled, in other words the 
logical order was changed and the results were stored in a text file. The above process i.e. 
the second step of third module was repeated multiple times (124 times in the case of this 
project) and the result is stored in different text files. Care was taken while changing the 
logical order of the block to ensure that the first block was the same as that in the original 
code. According to authors in [1], all metamorphic viruses created by this engine always 
have the same entry and exit points/blocks. Hence the virus was not parsed once it has 
reached the end of the last block. Though the blocks were linked using the conditional 
jumps, the original logical sequence could not be achieved unless the first block was 
parsed first. The following sections provide more detailed descriptions of the code 
obfuscation process performed in our engine.
4.3. Detailed description of the code obfuscation process
The sequence of transformations performed by our code obfuscation engine is shown in 
Figure 13. The virus code is first broken down into fixed size blocks. Blocks of dead code 
are then inserted followed by jump statement insertion and reordering of the blocks. Each 
step in the transformation will be explained in detail in subsequent sections.
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Figure 13: Code obfuscation process in our metamorphic engine
The first step in the obfuscation was breaking the code into fixed size blocks (Figure 14). 
One important thing that we had to take care of in this stage was to make sure some 
sections of the assembly code, which needed to remain together like the .stack and .data 
sections,  did not get split into different blocks.
Figure 14: Separation of virus code into blocks
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4.3.1.Jump statement insertion  
At the end of the first step the blocks were still all in logically correct order. The next 
step after chopping the code into these blocks involved the insertion of jump statements 
and this is depicted in the Figure 15 below.
Figure 15: Example of jump statement insertion
4.3.2.Dead code insertion  
Once the block of conditional jump instructions were attached at the end of each block 
(Figure 16). The blocks were stored in an array where each element in the array is a set of 
instructions and at the end of the array more dead code blocks were added. Each dead 
code block was stored in a singly array element. This increased the size of the array by 
the total number of garbage blocks. 
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Figure 16: Insertion of dead code blocks
4.3.3.Block re-ordering  
After the garbage code insertion the blocks were randomly shuffled. Figure 17 shows the 
control flow after this shuffle and this can be compared to the original code in Figure 14. 
The thing to note here is that the entry point for the virus always needs to be the original 
starting block. Thus block 1 being the starting block remains the same for all versions of 
the metamorphic virus. Similarly the program always ends with the end of last block and 
there is no garbage code or jump introduced after that.
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Figure 17: Rearrangement of blocks after shuffling 
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5. EXPERIMENT SETUP AND RESULTS
5.1. Experiment setup
Experiment platform: Windows XP, VMware virtual machine 
Programming language: Perl5
Dis-assemblers: OllyDbg and IDA pro. (Both free download versions)
Assembler: MASM
Linker: Tlink
Virus generator:                 PS-MPC Phalcon/Skism mass produced code generator 
   Virus scanner (for baseline check):  McAfee VirusScan
  
5.2.Test methodology  
The experiments in this project consisted of  three major phases. The first phase involved 
creating the seed virus required for this project and running baseline checks on the seed 
virus using pattern based detectors. Phase two involved running our code obfuscation 
engine on the seed virus to generate a family of metamorphic variants of the seed virus. 
The final phase involved testing the metamorphic viruses created by our engine using 
pattern based detectors and a HMM based detector.
5.2.1.Creation of the seed virus  
The virus generator used for creating the seed virus for this project was the 
Phalcon/Skism Mass Produced Code Generator (PS-MPC) from vxheavens.com [15]. 
For this experiment the viruses we created were unencrypted. The PS-MPC virus creator 
generated the assembly language code for the virus which we assembled using MASM 
assembler and converted into an executable using the Tlink linker. After this the virus 
executable was scanned using the McAfee VirusScan scanner which recognized it as a 
virus and flagged a warning. Figure 18 shows a screenshot of the result we obtained when 
we ran McAfee VirusScan on the virus created using PS-MPC.
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Figure 18: Seed virus being detected by McAfee VirusScan
5.2.2.Creation of metamorphic variants  
After making certain that the seed virus was detected by a pattern based scanner it was 
run through our code morphing engine to create metamorphic versions. For the purposes 
of our experiment 120 variants of the seed virus were created. The code morphing engine 
reads the assembly code for the virus divides the code into blocks and then randomly 
shuffles the block order while simultaneously inserting some dead code blocks.
Figure 19 shows a side by side comparison of two variants created by our code 
obfuscation engine (VIRUS1.asm and VIRUS2.asm) and illustrates the difference in code 
between the metamorphic variants. We can see the labels and the jump instructions 
inserted between the blocks and the differences in the block order. It is also evident that 
we keep the starting block in the same place.
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Figure 19: Two metamorphic variants generated by our code morphing engine
 
After creating the metamorphic variants of the original virus we assembled and linked 
these variants using the MASM assembler and Tlink linker and created executables for 
each of them (a Perl script was used to automate this process)
5.2.3.Testing metamorphic variants with commercial virus scanners  
In the third phase of our experiments the metamorphic viruses created in the second 
phase were tested with an off-the-shelf scanner and a HMM based detector.
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First the metamorphic viruses were scanned using the same scanner (McAfee VirusScan) 
used for checking the seed virus and it failed to detect the presence of any virus. Figure 
20 shows a screenshot capture of McAfee VirusScan after it was run on the folder 
containing the 120 metamorphic virus executables generated by our code obfuscation 
engine.
Figure 20: McAfee VirusScan fails to detect our metamorphic viruses
5.2.4.Testing metamorphic variants using HMM based detection  
Next our metamorphic viruses were tested against the HMM detector. First the 
executables were disassembled using the IDA pro disassembler and these assembly files 
were used for training the HMM. Our naming convention was to name all the files 
containing virus assembly code with the prefix “IDAN” and to name all the files 
containing benign (normal) assembly code with the prefix “IDAR”. Prior to HMM 
training the all the training files were in passed through the train-test module to create the 
alphabet and input files. The alphabet file contains the different observation symbols 
present in the training files and the input file contains the frequency of the observation 
symbols in the training files. We divided the 124 virus files into 5 sets of 24 files each as 
we performed k-fold HMM validation (in our case 5-fold validation). For each fold we 
used 4 sets different metamorphic versions of the original virus for training and creating a 
model file and used the 5th set for testing. For this experiment after running the four sets 
of IDAN files through the module the value for number of observation symbols were 
between 42 ~  44 and the total number of observation symbols present were between 
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21739 ~ 21959. We trained the files and created the model for 2 states. The number of 
iterations was set to be maximum of 800. 
5.3. Results
Once the HMM was trained the scores against the model file were obtained for both 
normal files and files belonging to the virus family. The scores for the viruses ranged 
between -2 to -8 (Appendix A) but for the normal files the scores ranged between -37 to 
-190 hence clearly separating the viruses from the normal files. 
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 Figure 21: Scatter graph of scores of normal and virus files with one of the model files
Figure 21 shows a scatter graph comparison of the HMM scores for the files from the 
metamorphic virus family we created with our engine and the scores for normal (benign) 
files. The figure provides a clear validation of the hypothesis in [2] about the property of 
metamorphic viruses being very similar to each other and very different from normal 
files. Similar results were obtained in all 5-fold validation with their respective model and 
test files.  The complete results are presented in appendices A and B.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The principal aim of this project was to show that viruses that are provably undetectable 
using signature-based scanning, can nevertheless be reliably detected using machine 
learning techniques.. To this end we created a code obfuscation engine conforming to the 
rules in [1]. According to a proof given in [1], these viruses cannot be detected using 
signature-based scanning. This was validated, since the metamorphic viruses created by 
our engine were not detected by the same signature-based detectors that had successfully 
identified the seed virus the metamorphic variants were created from.
We then demonstrated that the metamorphic viruses created using our code obfuscation 
engine could be detected by the HMM based detector described in [2]. This was done by 
performing five-fold HMM validation on 120 different metamorphic viruses and 
comparing the normalized similarity scores for viruses and normal programs. In all the 
cases the score ranges for the viruses were markedly different from those for the normal 
files, hence the viruses were identifiable in the HMM method by their similarity scores 
alone. In this way we were able to provide empirical proof that metamorphic viruses 
undetectable by pattern based scanners can be detected by machine learning based 
methods.
A good future research project would be to design a metamorphic virus-creating engine 
that can evade both signature-based detection and HMM-based detection. This however 
is not a trivial task since it means the virus would have to be highly metamorphic to avoid 
signature based detection and at the same time it would also need to look like normal 
code (in terms of the statistical signature of its instruction sequence) to evade HMM-
based detection.
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APPENDIX A: Normalized HMM Scores for Metamorphic 
Viruses and Normal Files 
Table1: Scores of files with model file 99_virus_N2_E0.model
SCORES OF FILES WITH N=2
Virus Files Normal Files
-5.5029656 -69.83376868
-2.4325415 -37.87830767
-2.4381414 -73.26371666
-2.4399423 -57.42153619
-2.421805 -47.56689641
-2.452382 -43.65816532
-8.4422612 -48.48792908
-2.4204001 -46.23059133
-2.4159194 -74.50382075
-2.4283433 -44.05335671
-2.4175014 -93.58188728
-2.4455148 -57.92270389
-2.5358185 -88.1007371
-2.428392 -191.0725346
-2.4169905 -65.19475889
-2.4258693 -34.2368562
-2.423987 -43.03456294
-2.5501224 -47.10429071
-2.4327782 -83.10736693
-2.4156856 -76.51210052
-2.4328526 -56.64371914
-2.4408223 -64.4991311
-2.4134945 -61.56445913
-5.5318651 -103.5941142
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Table2: Scores of files with model file 99_virus_N2_E1.model
SCORES OF FILES WITH N=2
Virus Files Normal Files
-2.42929 -43.0274
-2.42501 -47.0966
-5.49969 -83.1067
-2.4176 -76.5089
-2.41623 -56.6362
-2.42202 -65.2135
-2.41515 -63.3242
-5.53471 -103.593
-2.4268 -79.5003
-2.55107 -75.1983
-2.4392 -70.4338
-2.41701 -42.7951
-2.4177 -50.9171
-2.39951 -62.3496
-2.44303 -41.869
-2.42031 -81.0822
-2.40882 -185.725
-2.42636 -69.1235
-2.41216 -95.3118
-2.43944 -52.4204
-2.42554 -46.5878
-2.41714 -201.674
-2.41746 -102.636
-5.46022 -61.9248
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Table3: Scores of files with model file 99_virus_N2_E2.model
SCORES OF FILES WITH N=2
Virus File Normal File
-2.4244 -48.3463
-2.45852 -46.1009
-2.44365 -74.423
-2.42288 -43.9442
-2.45275 -93.4728
-2.46126 -57.7988
-2.58164 -88.0005
-2.47875 -190.972
-2.43661 -65.1368
-2.45632 -34.1023
-2.44438 -42.9306
-2.46801 -46.9584
-5.48544 -83.0168
-2.56762 -73.1635
-2.43439 -56.5274
-5.55586 -64.424
-2.45565 -61.4528
-2.45591 -103.484
-2.46459 -78.8726
-2.44951 -72.1967
-5.53626 -70.3457
-2.49845 -42.6742
-2.43378 -50.7948
-2.45301 -61.2119
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Table4: Scores of files with model file 99_virus_N2_E3.model
SCORES OF FILES WITH N=2
Virus Files Normal Files
-2.47524 -37.7559
-2.46186 -73.0907
-2.47741 -57.2996
-2.46358 -47.4359
-2.4529 -43.5317
-5.56455 -48.3407
-2.45472 -46.0959
-2.45751 -74.4178
-5.55153 -43.9443
-2.42727 -93.4689
-5.57162 -57.7988
-2.45641 -87.9972
-2.46027 -190.97
-2.46253 -65.1378
-2.43879 -34.1018
-2.46136 -42.9281
-2.43016 -46.9541
-5.56507 -83.0078
-2.45594 -73.1561
-5.60275 -56.5262
-2.43937 -64.4218
-2.43402 -61.45
-2.4696 -103.48
-2.46457 -78.875
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Table5: Scores of files with model file 99_virus_N2_E4.model
SCORES OF FILES WITH N=2
Virus File Normal File
-2.55592 -65.1906
-2.4061 -34.2304
-2.41149 -43.0272
-2.43066 -47.0969
-2.55067 -83.1038
-2.41977 -73.2777
-2.41104 -56.6362
-5.45948 -64.4872
-2.39883 -61.5634
-2.44326 -103.593
-2.43392 -78.9375
-2.41485 -72.2963
-2.45013 -70.4344
-2.41202 -42.7947
-2.41433 -50.9159
-2.42154 -61.3336
-2.42373 -41.8691
-2.41044 -81.0816
-2.42367 -185.724
-2.398 -67.8557
-2.40483 -94.029
-2.39655 -52.4195
-2.42012 -46.5861
-2.46457 -201.673
44
APPENDIX B: Scatter graph representation of HMM Training 
and Testing Results 
Figure 21: N = 2, E = 0
Figure 22: N =2, E = 1
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Figure 23: N =2, E = 2
Figure 24: N =2, E = 3
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Figure 25: N =2, E = 4
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